This paper extends the standard model of bundling as a price discrimination device to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, …rms have an incentive to introduce a bundling discount when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. Product substitutability typically gives an integrated …rm a greater incentive to o¤er a bundle discount (relative to the model with additive preferences), while substitutability is often the sole reason why separate sellers wish to o¤er inter-…rm discounts. When separate sellers coordinate on an inter-…rm discount, they can use the discount to overturn product substitutability and relax competition.
Introduction
Bundling-the practice whereby consumers are o¤ered a discount if they buy several distinct products-is used widely by …rms, and is the focus of a rich economic literature.
However, most of the existing literature discusses the phenomenon under relatively restrictive assumptions, namely a consumer's valuation for a bundle of several products is the sum of her valuations for consuming the items in isolation, and bundle discounts are only o¤ered for products sold by the same …rm. The two assumptions are related, in that when valuations are additive it is less likely that a …rm would wish to reduce its price to a customer who also buys a product from another seller. This paper analyzes the incentive to engage in bundling when these assumptions are relaxed.
There are very many situations in which modelling products as substitutes is relevant.
For instance, when visiting a city a tourist may gain some extra utility from visiting art gallery A if she has already visited art gallery B, but the incremental utility is likely to be This paper replaces an earlier draft with the title "Bundling revisited: substitute products and inter…rm discounts". I am grateful to a referee and associate editor, as well as to Jonathan Baker, Duarte Brito, Andrew Rhodes, John Thanassoulis, Helder Vasconcelos, John Vickers and Jidong Zhou, for many helpful comments. smaller than if she were only to visit A. Joint purchase discounts (or premia) on products o¤ered by separate sellers are rarer, though some examples include: -A tourist may be able to buy a "city pass", so that she can visit all participating tourist attractions at a discount on the sum of individual entry fees. These could be organized either as a joint venture by the attractions themselves, or implemented by an intermediary which puts together its own bundles given wholesale fees negotiated with attractions.
-Bundling is prevalent in markets for transport services, as is the case with alliances between airlines or when neighboring ski-lifts o¤er a combined ticket.
-Products supplied by separately-owned …rms are often marketed together with discounts for joint purchase. Thus, supermarkets and gasoline stations may cooperate to o¤er a discount when both services are consumed. Airlines and car rental …rms may link up for marketing purposes, and sometimes credit cards o¤er discounts proportional to spend towards designated ‡ights or hotels.
-Pharmaceuticals are sometimes used as part of a "cocktail" with one or more drugs supplied by other …rms. Drugs companies can set di¤erent prices depending on whether the drug is used on a stand-alone basis or in a cocktail.
-Marketing data may reveal useful information about a potential customer's purchase history which a¤ects a …rm's price to the customer. For instance, information that the customer has chosen to buy …rm 1's product may induce …rm 2 to discount its price, and an inter-…rm discount for the joint purchase of the two products is implemented.
-At a wholesale level, a manufacturer may o¤er a retailer a discount if the retailer does not stock a rival manufacturer's product. (Such contracts are sometimes termed "loyalty contracts".) This is a situation with a bundle premium instead of a discount.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I present a general framework for consumer demand for two products in the presence of product substitutability and bundle discounts. Section 3 covers the case where an integrated …rm supplies both products.
I revisit the approach to bundling presented in Long (1984) , which is used as a major ingredient for the analysis in section 3. Long's result is that the …rm has an incentive to bundle when demand for the bundle is more elastic than demand for stand-alone products.
Relative to the situation with additive preferences, the integrated …rm typically has a greater incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when products are substitutable. Because the purchase of one product can decrease a consumer's incremental utility from a second, the …rm has a direct incentive to reduce the price for a second item, in addition to the rent-extraction motive for bundling familiar from the existing literature. In examples we see that the size of the discount can be above or below the corresponding discount with additive preferences.
In section 4 I turn to the situation where products are supplied by separate sellers.
With additive preferences, a …rm has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when product valuations are negatively correlated. When there is full market coverage, a …rm has an incentive to o¤er a joint-purchase discount under plausible conditions on consumer valuations. When products are substitutes, whether a …rm has a unilateral incentive to introduce a discount depends on the way that preferences are modelled. When there is a constant disutility of joint consumption, separate sellers typically wish to o¤er a jointpurchase discount: the fact that a customer has purchased the rival product implies that her incremental valuation for the …rm's own item has fallen, and this usually implies that the …rm would like to reduce its price to this customer. Alternatively, if a proportion of buyers only want a single item (for instance, a tourist in a city might only have time to visit a single museum) while other consumers have additive preferences, a seller would like, if feasible, to charge a premium when a customer also buys the rival product. In examples, when this form of price discrimination is feasible, one price increases and the other decreases relative to the situation with uniform pricing, and price discrimination results in higher equilibrium pro…t and higher welfare, but a worse outcome for consumers.
Finally, section 5 investigates partial coordination between separate sellers, which is currently the relevant case for several of the industries mentioned above. Speci…cally, I
suppose that …rms …rst agree on a bundle discount which they fund jointly, and subsequently choose prices without coordination. When valuations are additive, it is shown that such a scheme will usually raise each …rm's pro…t, and, at least in the example considered, its operation will also boost total welfare. However, when sellers o¤er substitute products, the negotiated discount overturns the innate substitutability of products, inducing …rms to raise prices. The resulting "tari¤-mediated"product complementarity can induce collusion which harms consumers and overall welfare. This paper is not the …rst to investigate these issues. The incentive for an integrated seller to o¤er a discount for the purchase of multiple items is discussed by Adams and Yellen (1976) , Long (1984) and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) , among many others.
The latter two papers showed that it is optimal to introduce a bundle discount whenever the distribution of valuations is statistically independent and valuations are additive, so that a degree of joint pricing is optimal even with entirely unrelated products. Except for Long, these papers assume that valuations are additive.
1 Long (1984) presents what could be termed an "economic"model of bundling. Rather than following a diagrammatic exposition concentrating on the details of joint distributions of two-dimensional consumer valuations, he uses standard demand theory-which applies equally to non-additive preferences-to derive conditions under which a bundle discount is optimal.
Schmalensee (1982) and Lewbel (1985) study the incentive for a single-product monopolist to o¤er a discount if its customers also purchase a competitively-supplied product.
Schmalensee supposes that two items are for sale to a population of consumers, and item 1 is available at marginal cost due to competitive pressure while item 2 is supplied by a monopolist. Valuations are additive, but are not independent in the statistical sense. If there is negative correlation in the values for the two items, the fact that a consumer buys item 1 is "bad news"for the monopolist, who then has an incentive to set a lower price to its customers who also buy 1. Lewbel performs a similar exercise but allows the two items to be partial substitutes. In this case, the fact that a consumer buys item 1 is also bad news for the monopolist, and gives an incentive to o¤er a discount for joint consumption.
Bundling arrangements between separate …rms are analyzed by Gans and King (2006) , who investigate a model with two kinds of products (gasoline and food, say), and each product is supplied by two di¤erentiated …rms. When all four products are supplied by separate …rms which set their prices independently, there is no interaction between the two kinds of product. However, two …rms (one o¤ering each of the two kinds of product) can enter into an alliance and agree to o¤er consumers a discount if they buy both products from the alliance. (In their model, the joint pricing mechanism is similar to that used in section 5 below: …rms decide on their bundle discount, which they agree to fund equally, and then set prices non-cooperatively.) Gans and King observe that when a bundle discount is o¤ered for joint purchase of otherwise independent products, those products are converted into complements. In their model, in which consumer tastes are uniformly distributed, a pair of …rms does have an incentive to enter into such an alliance, but when both pairs do this their equilibrium pro…ts are unchanged from the situation when all four …rms set independent prices, although welfare and consumer surplus fall.
2 Calzolari and Denicolo (2011) propose a model where consumers buy two products and each product is supplied by a single …rm. Each …rm potentially o¤ers a nonlinear example, and a consumer's valuation for the bundle is some constant proportion (greater or less than one, depending on whether complements or substitutes are present) of the sum of her stand-alone valuations.
The focus of their analysis is on whether pure bundling is superior to linear pricing. 2 Brito and Vasconcelos (2010) modify this model so that rival suppliers of the same products are vertically rather than horizontally di¤erentiated. They …nd that when two pairs of …rms form an alliance all prices rise relative to the situation when all four products are marketed independently. This result resembles the analysis in section 5 below, where an agreed bundle discount induces collusion in the market. tari¤ which depends on a buyer's consumption of its own product and her consumption of the other …rm's product. They …nd that the use of these tari¤s can harm consumers compared to the situation in which …rms base their tari¤ only on their own supply. Their model di¤ers in two ways from the one presented in section 4 of this paper. First, in their model consumers have elastic (linear) demands, rather than unit demands, for the two products. Thus, they must consider general nonlinear tari¤s, while the …rms in my model merely choose a pair of prices. Second, in my model consumers di¤er in richer way, and a consumer might like product 1 but not product 2, and can vary in the degree of substitutability between products. In Calzolari and Denicolo (2011) , consumers di¤er by only a scalar parameter (the demand intercept for both products), and so all consumers view the two products when consumed alone as perfect substitutes.
Finally, Lucarelli, Nicholson, and Song (2010) discuss the case of pharmaceutical cocktails. Although the focus of their analysis is on situations in which …rms set the same price for a drug, regardless of whether it is used in isolation or as part of a cocktail, they also consider situations where …rms can set two di¤erent prices for the two kinds of uses.
They document how a …rm selling treatments for HIV/AIDS set di¤erent prices for similar chemicals depending on whether the drug was part of a cocktail or not. They estimate a demand system for colorectal cancer drugs, where there are at least 12 major drug treatments, 6 of which were cocktails combining drugs from di¤erent …rms. Although in this particular market …rms do not price drugs di¤erently depending whether the drug is used in a cocktail, they estimate the impact when one …rm engages in this form of price discrimination. They …nd that a …rm will typically (but not always) reduce the price for stand-alone use and raise the price for bundled use.
A Framework for Consumer Demand
Consider a market with two products, labeled 1 and 2, where a consumer buys either zero or one unit of each product (and maybe one unit of each). A consumer is willing to pay v i for product i = 1; 2 on its own, and to pay v b for the bundle of both products.
(A consumer obtains payo¤ zero if she consumers neither product.) Thus a consumer's preferences are described by the vector (v 1 ; v 2 ; v b ), which varies across the population of consumers according to some known distribution.
3 A consumer views the two products 3 In the analysis which follows, we assume that the stand-alone valuations (v 1 ; v 2 ) have a continuous marginal density with support on a compact rectangle in R 2 + . Given (v 1 ; v 2 ), the distribution of v b is sometimes deterministic (as in Example 1 below), sometimes discrete (as in Example 2), and sometimes continuous (as in Example 3). All we need to assume about the distribution of (v 1 ; v 2 ; v b ) is that it is as partial substitutes whenever v b v 1 + v 2 . Whenever there is free disposal, so that a consumer can discard an item without cost, we require that v b maxfv 1 ; v 2 g for all consumers.
Only deterministic selling procedures are considered in this paper. 4 Consumers face three prices: p 1 is the price for consuming product 1 on its own; p 2 is the price for product 2 on its own, and p 1 + p 2 is the price for consuming the bundle of both products.
Thus, is the discount for buying both products, which is zero if there is linear pricing or negative if consumers are charged a premium for joint consumption. A consumer chooses the option from the four discrete choices which leaves her with the highest surplus, so she will buy both items whenever v b (p 1 + p 2 ) maxfv 1 p 1 ; v 2 p 2 ; 0g, she will buy product i = 1; 2 on its own whenever v i p i maxfv b (p 1 + p 2 ); v j p j ; 0g, and otherwise she buys nothing.
As functions of the three tari¤ parameters (p 1 ; p 2 ; ), denote by Q 1 the proportion of potential consumers who buy only product 1, Q 2 the proportion who buy only product 2, and Q b the proportion who choose the bundle. It will also be useful to discuss demand when no discount is o¤ered, so let
be the corresponding demand functions when = 0. Indeed, we will see that a …rm's incentive to introduce a bundle discount is determined entirely by the properties of the "no-discount"demands q i and q b . This is important insofar as these demand functions are easier to estimate from market data than the more hypothetical demands Q i and Q b .
5
Several properties of these demand functions follow immediately from the discrete choice nature of the consumer's problem, and are not contingent on whether the products are partial substitutes. To illustrate, note that total demand for each product is an increasing function of the bundle discount, i.e.,
su¢ ciently well behaved that the demand functions shortly de…ned are di¤erentiable. 4 Unlike the single-product case, when a monopolist sells two or more products it can often increase its pro…ts if it is able to use stochastic schemes (e.g., where for a speci…ed price the consumer gets product 1 or product 2 but she is not sure which one). See Pavlov (2011) for a recent contribution to this topic, which studies cases with extreme substitutes (all consumers buy a single item) and with additive preferences. 5 The model of consumer preferences presented here is related to the small empirical literature which estimates discrete consumer choice when multiple goods are chosen simultaneously. For instance, see Gentzkow (2007) who estimates the degree of complementarity between print and online newspapers. In his illustrative model in section 1.A, he supposes that the value of the bundle is the sum of the values of the two individual products plus a constant term (which could be positive or negative), which is similar to Example 1 discussed later in this paper.
To see this, observe that a consumer buys product 1, say, if and only if
(The left-hand side above is the consumer's maximum surplus if she buys product 1-either in the bundle or on its own-while the right-hand side is the consumer's maximum surplus if she does not buy the product.) Clearly, the set of such consumers is increasing (in the set-theoretic sense) in . In the case of separate supply, analyzed in section 4, this implies that when a …rm unilaterally introduces a bundle discount, its rival's pro…ts will rise.
We necessarily have Slutsky symmetry of cross-price e¤ects, so that
For instance, the left-hand side of (2) says that the e¤ect on demand for good 2 on its own of a price rise of good 1 on its own (which is achieved by increasing p 1 and by the same amount so that the bundle price does not change) is the same as the e¤ect on demand for good 1 on its own of price rise for good 2 on its own. Setting = 0 in the right-hand expression in (2) implies that the impact of a small bundle discount on the total demand for a product is equal to the impact of a corresponding price cut on bundle demand, i.e.,
This identity plays a key role when we analyze the pro…tability of introducing a discount.
One price e¤ect which does depend on the innate substitutability of products is the following:
Claim 1 Suppose that v b v 1 + v 2 for all consumers. Then when linear prices are used, demand for product i, q i + q b , weakly increases with p j .
(All omitted proofs are contained in the appendix.) Importantly, when a bundle discount is o¤ered, this result can be reversed: even if products are intrinsically substitutes then when > 0 the demand for a product can decrease with the stand-alone price of the other product. The observation that a bundle discount can overturn the innate substitutability of products is a recurring theme in the following analysis.
A second property of demand which depends on product substitutability is that any consumer who chooses to buy the bundle at linear prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) has v j p j for each j = 1; 2. To see this, note that if a consumer with preferences (v 1 ; v 2 ; v b ) buys the bundle
, where the …rst inequality follows from substitutability and the second is due to the superiority of the bundle to product i on its own. Thus, minfv 1 p 1 ; v 2 p 2 g 0. This implies that with linear pricing there is no "margin" between buying the bundle and buying nothing, and any consumer who optimally buys the bundle would instead buy a single item (if they change at all) rather than exit altogether when faced with a small price rise. A second implication is that the set of consumers who buy something with linear prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) consists of those consumers with preferences satisfying maxfv 1 p 1 ; v 2 p 2 g 0. (Clearly, if v i p i then the consumer will buy something, since product i on its own yields positive surplus. Those consumers who buy the bundle lie inside this set since they satisfy minfv 1 p 1 ; v 2 p 2 g 0.) In particular, the fraction of participating consumers, which is
only on the (marginal) distribution of the stand-alone valuations (v 1 ; v 2 ).
3 Integrated Supply
Long' s analysis revisited
Suppose that the market structure is such that an integrated monopolist supplies both products. Here, and in section 4 with separate supply, suppose that the constant marginal cost of supplying product i is equal to c i . To avoid tedious caveats involving corner solutions in the following analysis, suppose that over the relevant range of linear prices there is some two-item demand, so that q b > 0.
In this section I recapitulate the analysis in Long (1984) , as the integrated-…rm analysis throughout section 3 rests on this. The …rm's pro…t with bundling tari¤ (p 1 ; p 2 ; ) is
Consider the incentive to o¤er a bundle discount. Starting from linear prices (p 1 ; p 2 ), by di¤erentiating (4) we see that the impact on pro…t of introducing a small discount > 0 is
where the second equality follows from expression (3).
Although Long also considers the asymmetric case, his analysis is greatly simpli…ed when products are symmetric, and for the remainder of section 3 assume that c 1 = c 2 = c and the same density of consumers have taste vector (v 1 ; v 2 ; v b ) as have the permuted taste vector (v 2 ; v 1 ; v b ). Since the environment is symmetric, for convenience we consider only tari¤s which are symmetric in the two products. If the …rm o¤ers price p for either product and no bundle discount, write x s (p) and x b (p) respectively for the proportion of consumers who buy a single item and who buy the bundle. (Thus, x s (p) q 1 (p; p) + q 2 (p; p) and (5), a small discount is pro…table with stand-alone price p in this symmetric setting if and only if
Consider whether this is satis…ed at the most pro…table linear price, p . Since p maximizes
, the …rst-order condition for p is
Taking this together with expression (6), we see that it is pro…table to introduce a bundle
This discussion is summarized in this result:
6 Proposition 1 Suppose an integrated monopolist supplies two symmetric products. The …rm has an incentive to introduce a discount for buying the bundle whenever the demand for a single item is less elastic than the demand for the bundle, so that
strictly decreases with p :
Condition (7) is intuitive: if the …rm initially charges the same price for buying a single item as for buying a second item, and if demand for the latter is more elastic than demand for the former, then the …rm would like to reduce its price for buying a second item (and to increase its price for the …rst item).
Consider the familiar knife-edge case where a consumer's valuation for the bundle is the sum of her stand-alone valuations, i.e., v b v 1 + v 2 . With additive valuations, if the …rm o¤ers the linear price p for buying either item the consumer's decision is simple: she should buy product i whenever v i p. De…ne
so that
Proposition 1 implies, therefore, that the …rm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount if (p) strictly decreases with p
(at the most pro…table linear price p ). Condition (9) holds, roughly speaking, if v 1 and v 2
are not "too" positively correlated. In particular, a degree of bundling is pro…table even if valuations are additive and statistically independent. As we explore in the next section, the more fundamental condition (7) is also useful for situations outside this additive case.
Bundling with substitute products
Using Long's condition (7), in this section I analyze in more detail the …rm's incentive to bundle when preferences are not additive. One advantage of assuming symmetry in the two products is that what is in general the three-dimensional nature of preferences reduces to just two dimensions, since only the highest stand-alone valuation matters out of (v 1 ; v 2 ).
With this in mind, given preferences (v 1 ; v 2 ; v b ), de…ne
so that V 1 is a consumer's maximum utility if she buys only one item and V 2 is her incremental utility from the second item. Note that v b = V 1 + V 2 , so that valuations are additive after this change of variables. Given the linear price p for each item, the type-(V 1 ; V 2 ) consumer will buy one item if V 1 p and V 2 < p, and she will buy both items if V 2 p and
, and this pattern of demand is depicted on Figure 1A . In general, a consumer might buy both items even if she does not obtain positive surplus from buying only one, so there is a "margin"between buying the bundle and buying nothing. However, if products are substitutes this margin disappears:
the support of (V 1 ; V 2 ) lies under the 45 0 line as shown on Figure 1B .
From now on, assume that the products are substitutes. Similarly to (8), de…ne
By examining Figure 1B we see that Figure 1A : General case Figure 1B : Substitute products Therefore, when is strictly decreasing Proposition 1 implies that the monopolist has an incentive to introduce at least a small bundle discount. In fact, we can obtain the following non-local result, which is our main result for integrated supply:
Proposition 2 Suppose products are substitutes and in (11) is strictly decreasing. Then the most pro…table bundling tari¤ for a monopolist involves a positive bundle discount.
The fundamental condition which makes bundling pro…table for an integrated seller is (7), and this condition applies regardless of whether products are substitutes or not.
However, the more transparent condition that in (11) be decreasing only applies when products are substitutes. Otherwise, the pattern of demand looks like Figure 1A above, and does not capture all the relevant demand information.
for the corresponding marginal density. (The densities g 1 and g 2 are the "measures" of the lines marked on Figure 1B .) The condition that is decreasing is equivalent to the hazard rates satisfying g 1 =(1 G 1 ) < g 2 =(1 G 2 ). As is well known, a su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that the likelihood ratio
Whenever (12) holds, then, the …rm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount.
Proposition 2 applies equally to an alternative framework where the monopolist supplies a single product, and where consumers consider buying one or two units of this product.
Here, the parameter V 1 represents a consumer's value of one unit and V 2 is her incremental value for the second. Thus when consumers have diminishing marginal utility (V 2 V 1 ) and in (11) is decreasing, the single-product …rm will o¤er a nonlinear tari¤ which involves a quantity discount. 7 (However, this alternative interpretation of the model is not natural in the separate sellers context of section 4, since we would have to assume that for some reason a supplier could only sell a single unit of the product to a consumer.)
A natural question is whether products being substitutes makes it more likely that the integrated …rm wishes to introduce a bundle discount, relative to the same market but with additive valuations. Consider a market where the stand-alone valuations, v 1 and v 2 , have a given (symmetric) distribution. We know from Proposition 1 that the …rm has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount whenever x b =x s is decreasing in the linear price Intuitively, when products are substitutes there is an extra motive to o¤er a bundle discount, relative to the additive case, which is to try to serve customers with a second item even though the incremental utility of the second item is lowered by the purchase of the …rst item. Once a customer has purchased one item, this is bad news for her willingnessto-pay for the other item, and this often gives the …rm a motive to reduce price for the 7 See Maskin and Riley (1984) for an early contribution to the theory of quantity discounts, where-in contrast to the current paper-consumers di¤er by only a scalar parameter.
8 An example where the substitutability of products makes the …rm less likely to engage in bundling is as follows. Suppose that v b = v 1 + v 2 if minfv 1 ; v 2 g k and v b = maxfv 1 ; v 2 g otherwise, where k is a positive constant. Thus, preferences are additive when both stand-alone valuations are high, while if one valuation does not meet the threshold k the incremental value for the second item is zero. With these preferences, whenever the linear price satis…es p < k those consumers with minfv 1 ; v 2 g k will buy both items, and this set does not depend on p. Therefore, bundle demandx b is completely inelastic for p < k, while in the corresponding example without substitution (i.e., setting k = 0), bundle demand is elastic. Whenever k is large enough that the equilibrium linear price is below k, the …rm strictly lowers its pro…ts if it introduces a bundle discount: it reduces its revenue from those who buy the bundle without any compensating boost to overall demand. second item. With additive preferences, the only motive in this model to use a bundle discount is to extract information rents from consumers, and this motive vanishes if the …rm knows consumer preferences. With sub-additive preferences, the …rm may wish to o¤er a bundling tari¤ even when it knows the customer's tastes. While with integrated supply sub-additive preferences merely give one additional reason to bundle, with separate sellers such preferences will often be the sole reason to o¤er a bundle discount, as discussed in section 4.
Special cases
In this section I describe three special cases to illustrate this analysis of bundling incentives, as well as some equilibrium bundling tari¤s.
Example 1: Constant disutility of joint consumption.
Consider the situation in which for all consumers
for some constant z 0. Here, to ensure free disposal we assume that the minimum possible realization of v i is greater than z. With a linear price p i for buying product i, the pattern of demand is as shown on Figure 2 . The next result provides a su¢ cient condition for bundling to be pro…table in this setting.
Claim 2 Suppose that bundle valuations are given by (13). Suppose that each valuation v i has marginal c.d.f. F and marginal density f , and the hazard rate f ( )=(1 F ( )) is strictly increasing. Then a monopolist has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount when condition (9) holds.
To illustrate, suppose that (v 1 ; v 2 ) is uniformly distributed on the unit square [1; 2] 2 , and that z = 
which generates pro…t of about 0:446, and about 66% of potential consumers buy something but now 28% buy both items. This bundle discount is large enough to outweigh the innate substitutability of the products (i.e., > z), and faced with this bundling tari¤ consumers now view the two products as complements rather than substitutes. (The resulting pattern of demand looks as depicted in Figure 5 .) Nevertheless, the discount in (14) is smaller than it is in the corresponding example with additive valuations (i.e., when z = 0). A natural reason why products might be substitutes is that some buyers are only able to consume a restricted set of products, perhaps due to time constraints. (Recall that with free disposal we require that v b be at least maxfv 1 ; v 2 g, and we require v b v 1 + v 2 if products are substitutes.) The support of (V 1 ; V 2 ) on Figure 1B in this example is 0 V 2 V 1 1, and calculations reveal that the joint density for (V 1 ; V 2 ) on this support is 2 log One can check that x b =x s strictly decreases with p, and Proposition 1 implies that the …rm will wish to o¤er a bundle discount. One can modify Figure 1B to allow the …rm to o¤er a discount > 0, and integrate the density for (V 1 ; V 2 ) over the regions corresponding to single-item and bundle demand, to obtain explicit (but tedious) expressions for singleitem and bundle demands in terms of the tari¤ parameters (p; ). Using these expressions, one can calculate the optimal bundling tari¤ to be p 0:648 and 0:588, which yields pro…t 0.463. Notice that the bundle discount is now deeper compared to the corresponding example with additive values. 11 With this bundling tari¤, where the incremental price for the second item is rather small, about 51% of potential consumers buy the bundle and only 15% buy a single item. 4 Separate Sellers
General analysis
I turn now to the situation where the two products are supplied by separate sellers. In contrast to the integrated seller case, here there is no signi…cant advantage in assuming that products are symmetric, and we no longer make that assumption. Suppose that the sellers set their tari¤s simultaneously and non-cooperatively. (The next section discusses a setting in which …rms coordinate on their inter-…rm bundle discount.) When …rms o¤er linear prices-i.e., prices which are not contingent on whether the consumer also purchases the other product-…rm i chooses its price p i given its rival's price to maximize
In some circumstances, a …rm can condition its price on whether a consumer also buys the other …rm's product. For instance, a museum could ask a visitor to show her entry ticket to the other museum to claim a discount. Suppose now that …rm i o¤ers a discount > 0 from its price p i to those consumers who purchase product j as well. (Those consumers who only buy product i continue to pay p i .) Then …rm i's pro…t is
and the impact on pro…t of a small joint purchase discount is governed by the sign of
, which from (3) is equal to
When demand for the single item is less elastic than bundle demand, so that (15) is strictly negative, i.e., (17) is strictly positive. In this case, o¤ering a discount for joint purchase will raise the …rm's pro…t.
Thus, discounts for joint purchase can arise even when products are supplied by separate …rms and when a …rm chooses and funds the discount unilaterally. The reason is straightforward: since the own-price elasticity of bundle demand is higher than that of demand for its stand-alone product, a …rm wants to o¤er a lower price to those consumers who also buy the other product. As expression (1) shows, the introduction of a discount will also bene…t the rival …rm.
We summarise this discussion as:
Proposition 3 Suppose that demand for the bundle is more elastic than demand for …rm i's stand-alone product, in the sense that
Starting from the situation where …rms set equilibrium linear prices p 1 and p 2 , …rm i has an incentive to o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy product j: If expression (18) is reversed, so that q b =q i increases with p i , then …rm i would like if feasible to charge its customers a premium if they buy product j.
The crucial di¤erence between condition (18) and the corresponding condition (7) with integrated supply is that with a single seller both prices are increased, whereas with separate sellers only one price rises. With substitute products and linear pricing, a …rm competes on three fronts. If it raises its price: (i) some consumers will switch from buying the bundle to buying the rival product alone; (ii) some will switch from buying its product alone to buying the rival product alone, and (iii) some consumers will switch from buying its product alone to buying nothing. (As discussed in section 2, with substitutes a possible fourth margin between buying the bundle and buying nothing is absent.) Broadly speaking, condition (18) requires that margins (ii) and (iii) together are less signi…cant, relative to the size of associated demand, than margin (i).
When products are asymmetric, at the equilibrium linear prices it is possible that one …rm has an incentive to o¤er a discount when a customer also buys the other …rm's product, but the other …rm does not. 12 However, it may well be that both …rms choose to o¤er such a discount. If …rm i = 1; 2 o¤ers the price p i when a consumer only buys its product and the price p i i when she also buys the other product, a consumer who buys the bundle pays the price p 1 +p 2 1 2 . The issue then arises as to how the combined discount = 1 + 2 is implemented. For instance, a consumer might have to buy the two items sequentially, and …rms cannot simultaneously require proof of purchase from the other seller when they o¤er their discount. However, there are at least two natural ways to implement this inter…rm bundling scheme. First, the bundle discount could be implemented via an electronic sales platform which allows consumers to buy products from several sellers simultaneously.
Sellers choose their prices contingent on which other products (if any) a consumers buys, a website displays the total prices for the various combinations, and …rms receive their stipulated revenue from the chosen combination. With such a mechanism there is no need for …rms to coordinate their tari¤s. Second, there may be "product aggregators" present in the market who put together their own bundles from products sourced from separate …rms and retail these bundles to …nal consumers. In the two-product case discussed in this paper, aggregators bundle the two products together and each …rm chooses a wholesale price for its product contingent on being part of the bundle. If the aggregator market is competitive, the price of the bundle will simply be the sum of the two wholesale prices.
Again, there is no need for …rms to coordinate their prices.
A major di¤erence between this inter-…rm bundling discount and the discount o¤ered by an integrated supplier is that with separate sellers the discount is chosen non-cooperatively.
A bundle is, by de…nition, made up of two "complementary"components, namely, …rm 1's product and …rm 2's product, and the total price for the bundle is the sum of each …rm's component price p i i . When a …rm considers the size of its own discount i , it ignores the bene…t this discount confers on its rival. Thus, as usual with separate supply of complementary components, double marginalization will result and the overall discount = 1 + 2 will be too small (for given stand-alone prices).
Special cases
In this section, I analyze in more depth various special cases where separate sellers have an incentive to introduce a joint-purchase discount. Consider …rst the situation where consumer valuations are additive, so that margin (ii) discussed in section 4 is absent and …rms do not compete with each other:
Proposition 4 Suppose that valuations are additive, i.e., v b = v 1 + v 2 . Starting from the situation where …rms set equilibrium linear prices, …rm i has an incentive to o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy the other product whenever Prfv j p j v i g strictly increases with v i .
Whenever the valuations are negatively correlated in the strong sense that Prfv j p j v i g decreases with v i , then, a …rm has an incentive to o¤er a discount for joint purchase. Somewhat counter-intuitively, those …rms which o¤er products which appeal to very di¤erent kinds of consumer (boxing and ballet, say) may wish to o¤er discounts to consumers who buy the other product.
In the oligopoly context, it is sometimes natural to consider situations with full coverage, so that all consumers buy something for the relevant range of linear prices. 13 (This is relevant when the minimum possible realizations of v 1 and v 2 are su¢ ciently high.) When the outside option of zero is not relevant for any consumer's choice, all that matters for demand is the distribution of incremental utilities, and given the triple
for the incremental valuation for product i given the consumer already has product j. Figure 4 , a consumer will buy both items with linear prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) provided thatv 1 p 1 andv 2 p 2 , and otherwise she will buy product 1 instead of product 2 whenv 1 p 1 v 2 p 2 . In particular, margin (iii) discussed in section 4.1 is no longer present, and this may boost the incentive to o¤er a bundle discount. Write G i (v i jv j ) for the c.d.f. forv i conditional onv j , and write g i (v i jv j ) for the associated conditional density. Consider this assumption on the hazard rate:
strictly increases withv i and weakly increases withv j :
It is somewhat reasonable to suppose that this hazard rate increases withv i . That the hazard rate weakly increases withv j is perhaps less economically natural, but includes independence ofv 1 andv 2 as a particular case.
Proposition 5 Suppose at the relevant linear prices there is full consumer coverage. If the incremental valuations in (19) satisfy condition (20), then …rm i has an incentive to o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy the other product.
When the market is covered, this result suggests that the incentive to introduce a discount contingent on buying another …rm's product is present for many pairs of suppliers.
We next consider the impact of inter-…rm bundling in two of the examples with nonadditive valuations introduced in section 3.3.
Example 1. Here, the pattern of consumer demand was illustrated in Figure 2 . Write Claim 3 Suppose that bundle valuations satisfy (13) and the stand-alone valuations satisfy
strictly increases with v i and weakly increases with v j :
Then a seller has an incentive to o¤er a discount to consumers who buy the rival's product.
It is economically intuitive that products being substitutes of the form (13) will give the …rm an incentive to o¤er a discount when its customers purchase the rival product. If the potential customer purchases the other product, this is bad news for the …rm as the customer's incremental value for its product has been shifted downwards by z, and this provides an incentive to o¤er a lower price.
Consider the same speci…c example as presented in section 3-that is,
and c = 1-applied to the case with separate sellers. The equilibrium linear price is p 1:446 and industry pro…t is about 0.399. Around 9% of consumers buy both items with this linear price, and 80% buy something. The equilibrium non-cooperative bundling tari¤ is
Here, the combined bundle discount, = 1 + 2 , is about one quarter the size of the discount with integrated supply in (14), re ‡ecting the earlier discussion that separate …rms will non-cooperatively choose too small a discount. Now, around 14% of consumers buy both items, and industry pro…t rises to 0.421. Intuitively, when …rms o¤er a bundle discount, this reduces the e¤ective degree of substitution between products, which in turn relaxes competition between …rms. As reported in Table 2 below, relative to the outcome with linear pricing, here consumers in aggregate are harmed, but total welfare rises, when …rms unilaterally o¤er a discount. Note that the equilibrium linear price lies between the two discriminatory prices when …rms engage in this form of price discrimination.
14 Example 2. Consider next the situation in which some consumers are time constrained, so that a fraction of consumers have additive preferences and the remaining consumers wish to buy either product 1 or product 2. Suppose the distribution of stand-alone valuations (v 1 ; v 2 ) is the same for the two kinds of consumer. Then we can obtain the following result:
Claim 4 Suppose that some consumers are time-constrained, and that stand-alone valuations v 1 and v 2 are independently distributed, where v i has distribution function F i ( ) and density f i ( ), and where for each i the hazard rate f i ( )=(1 F i ( )) is strictly increasing.
When the two products are supplied by separate sellers, a seller has no incentive to o¤er a discount to those consumers who buy the rival product. They would, if feasible, like to charge their customers a higher price when they buy the rival product.
In this setting, the observation that a consumer wishes to buy both items implies she belongs to the "non-competitive" group of consumers, and a …rm would like to exploit its monopoly position over those consumers if feasible. Of course, in many situations, a consumer can hide her purchase from a rival …rm, in which case a …rm cannot feasibly levy a premium when a customer buys another supplier's product. Comparing Examples 1 and 2 shows that the precise manner in which products are substitutes is important for a …rm's incentive to o¤er a bundling discount unilaterally.
The fundamental condition governing when a …rm unilaterally wishes to introduce a joint-purchase discount is (18). All the special cases considered in this section have the same underlying logic, which is to …nd conditions under which single-item demand is more, or less, elastic than bundle demand. With additive preferences, Proposition 4, shows that negative correlation between the two valuations implies demand for a …rm's product on its own is less elastic than demand for the bundle. This is due to the fact that the size of bundle demand is then small relative to stand-alone demand. With full coverage, Proposition 5 (as well as the closely related Claim 3) shows how single-item demand is less elastic than bundle demand, but for a di¤erent reason: the margin (i) between buying the bundle and buying only product 2 is more competitive than the margin (ii) between buying only product 1 or only product 2. When some consumers are time-constrained (Claim 4), margin (ii) is now less competitive than margin (i), and a …rm wishes to raise its price to those consumers the set of consumers who buy both products), then the equilibrium non-discriminatory price lies between the two discriminatory prices. However, we cannot apply Corts'result directly, since his argument relies on there being no cross-price e¤ects across the two consumer groups, which is not the case here.
wishing to buy the bundle.
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Partial Coordination Between Sellers
The analysis to this point has considered the two extreme cases where there is no tari¤ coordination between separate sellers (section 4), and where there is complete tari¤ coordination (section 3). The problem with complete coordination is that any competition between rivals is eliminated. As discussed in section 4, though, the welfare problem with a policy of permitting no coordination between sellers is that the resulting bundle discount may be ine¢ ciently small (or non-existent). It would be desirable to obtain the e¢ ciency gains which may accrue to bundling without permitting the …rms to collude over their regular prices.
One way this might be achieved is if …rms …rst negotiate an inter-…rm bundle discount, the funding of which they agree to share, and then compete by choosing their stand-alone prices non-cooperatively. Speci…cally, suppose the two …rms are symmetric and consider the following joint pricing scheme: …rms …rst coordinate on bundle discount , and if …rm i = 1; 2 sets the stand-alone price p i then the price for buying both products is p 1 + p 2 and …rm i receives revenue p i 1 2 when a bundle is sold.
Consider …rst the case where valuations are additive, so that competition concerns are absent. Firm i's pro…t under this scheme is
where each …rm's price is a function of the agreed discount as determined by the secondstage non-cooperative choice of prices. The impact of introducing a small > 0 on …rm i's equilibrium pro…t is equal to
Here, the two terms (24)- (25) re ‡ect the indirect e¤ect of the discount on the …rm's pro…t via its impact on the two prices, p i and p j , both of which vanish, and the …nal expression (26) follows from (3). Expression (24) vanishes because p is the optimal price for …rm i when …rms choose linear prices (i.e., p maximizes (p i c)(q i + q b )). Expression (25) vanishes because changing the other …rm's price has no impact on a …rm's demand when there is no bundling discount and valuations are additive (i.e., q i + q b does not depend on p j when valuations are additive). Thus, the …rst-order impact of on industry pro…t is that, for a …xed stand-alone price p , the discount boosts overall demand but reduces revenue from each bundle sold. Following the discussion in section 3.1, in the additive case expression (26) . The resulting payo¤s in the market are reported in the …rst row of While the operation of the joint-pricing scheme appears relatively benign when values are additive, this can be reversed when …rms o¤er substitutable products. Consumers bene…t, and total welfare rises, when …rms are forced to set low prices due to products being substitutes. However, an agreed inter-…rm discount can reduce the e¤ective substitutability of products and relax competition between suppliers. To illustrate this e¤ect, modify the preceding example so that z = 1 4
. The impact of partial coordination in this case is reported in Thus, the apparently pro-consumer policy of coordinating to o¤er a discount for joint purchase may act as a device to sustain collusion. This suggests that negotiated inter…rm discounting schemes operated by …rms supplying substitutable products should be viewed with some suspicion by antitrust authorities, although non-cooperative discounting schemes as analyzed in section 4 may actually be welfare-enhancing.
Conclusions
This paper has extended the standard model of bundling to allow products to be partial substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. With monopoly supply, building on Long (1984), we typically found that the …rm has an incentive to o¤er a bundle discount in at least as many cases as with the traditional model with additive valuations.
Sub-additive preferences give the …rm an additional reason to o¤er a bundle discount, which is to better target a low price for a second item at those customers who are inclined (with linear prices) to buy a single item. We observed that the impact of substitutability could amplify or diminish the size of the most pro…table bundle discount.
When products were supplied by separate …rms, we found that a …rm often has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a joint-purchase discount when their customers buy rival products.
In such cases, inter-…rm bundle discounts are achieved without any need for coordination between suppliers. The two principal situations in which a …rm might wish to do this are (i) when product valuations are negatively correlated in the population of consumers, and
(ii) when products are substitutes in such a way that bundle demand was more elastic than single-item demand. While product substitutability makes bundle demand smaller than it would otherwise be, it need not make such demand more elastic. Plausible kinds of substitution lead …rms to o¤er either a joint-purchase discount or a joint-purchase premium. In an example (Example 1) we saw that when …rms price discriminate in this manner, relative to the uniform pricing regime equilibrium pro…ts are higher and welfare rises. One reason why pro…ts rise is that when …rms o¤er an inter-…rm bundle discount, this mitigates the innate substitutability of their products and competition is relaxed.
Historically, this form of price discrimination was not often observed. In many cases, in order to condition price on a purchase from a rival supplier, a …rm would need a "paper trail"such as a receipt from the rival. One problem with this system is that customers are then encouraged to visit the rival …rm …rst, and because of transaction and travel costs, this might mean that fewer customers would actually come to the …rm. A second problem is that it is hard for two …rms to o¤er such discounts, since a customer might have to visit the …rms sequentially. However, as discussed in section 4, these two related problems can nowadays often be overcome with modest methods of selling, and we may see greater use of this kind of contingent pricing in future.
A more traditional way to implement inter-…rm bundling is for …rms to coordinate aspects of their pricing strategy. In this paper I examined one particular kind of coordination, which is where …rms agree on a joint purchase discount, and subsequently choose their prices non-cooperatively. Because a bundle discount mitigates the innate substitutability of rival products, separate sellers can use this mechanism to lessen rivalry in the market.
Thus, …rms often have an incentive to explore joint pricing schemes of this form, and regulators have a corresponding incentive to be wary.
In future work it would be useful to extend the analysis in this paper in at least three directions. First, how do the results change if the products are complements rather than substitutes? Second, what happens if the products in question are intermediate products?
It may be that the framework studied here could sometimes be extended to situations where rival manufacturers potentially supply products to a retailer, which then supplies one or both products to …nal consumers. If products are partial substitutes, might a manufacturer have an incentive to charge a lower price if the retailer also chooses to supply the rival product? This would then be the opposite pricing pattern to the "loyalty pricing" schemes which worry antitrust authorities. Finally, it would be interesting to explore whether a "large"…rm has an incentive to exclude smaller …rms from its internal bundling policies, with the aim of driving these rivals out of the market. In a famous antitrust case concerning ski-lifts in the Aspen resort, described in Easterbrook (1986) , one small ski-lift operator successfully sued a larger operator for not permitting it to participate in its multi-mountain ski-pass scheme. 
I claim that the di¤erence between the two sides in (27) , that is maxfv b p 1 p 2 ; v 1 p 1 g maxfv 2 p 2 ; 0g ;
is weakly increasing in p 2 for all (v 1 ; v 2 ; v b ). (This then implies that the set of consumer types who buy product 1 is increasing, in the set-theoretic sense, in p 2 , and so the measure of such consumers is increasing in p 2 .) The only way in which expression (28) could strictly decrease with p 2 is if v b p 1 p 2 > v 1 p 1 and v 2 p 2 < 0. However, since products are substitutes we have v b v 1 + v 2 , which implies that the above pair of inequalities are contradictory. This establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We know already that choosing > 0 is more pro…table than choosing = 0 when expression (7) holds, which in turn is true when (11) is strictly decreasing. Therefore, it remains to rule out the possibility that a tari¤ with a quantity premium is optimal. So suppose to the contrary that the …rm makes greatest pro…t by charging P 1 for the …rst item and P 2 > P 1 for the second. By modifying Figure 1B to allow P 2 > P 1 , one sees that the …rm's pro…t takes the additively separable form
(1 G(P 1 ))(P 1 c) + (1 G(P 2 )) (P 2 )(P 2 c)
where we write G(p)
PrfV 1 pg. This pro…t is therefore greater than when the …rm o¤ers either of the linear prices P 1 and P 2 . That is to say
(1 G(P 1 ))(P 1 c)+(1 G(P 2 )) (P 2 )(P 2 c) (1 G(P 1 ))(P 1 c)+(1 G(P 1 )) (P 1 )(P 1 c)
or
(1 G(P 2 )) (P 2 )(P 2 c) (1 G(P 1 )) (P 1 )(P 1 c) ;
and
(1 G(P 1 ))(P 1 c)+(1 G(P 2 )) (P 2 )(P 2 c) (1 G(P 2 ))(P 2 c)+(1 G(P 2 )) (P 2 )(P 2 c) or
(1 G(P 1 ))(P 1 c) (1 G(P 2 ))(P 2 c) :
Since (11) is strictly decreasing, (29) implies that
(1 G(P 2 )) (P 2 )(P 2 c) > (1 G(P 1 )) (P 2 )(P 1 c) ;
which contradicts expression (30). Thus, the most pro…table tari¤ involves P 2 < P 1 . and so (11) is given by
Proof of Claim
Di¤erentiating shows that is strictly decreasing with p if and only if
Since F is assumed to have an increasing hazard rate, the right-hand side of the above is non-negative, while if condition (9) holds then the left-hand side is strictly negative.
Therefore, is strictly decreasing and Proposition 2 implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let F i (v i ) and f i (v i ) be respectively the marginal c.d.f. and the marginal density for v i , and let H(v i ) Prfv j p j j v i g, where p j is …rm j's equilibrium linear price. Then
Since H is assumed to be strictly increasing in v i , it follows from (31) that
and so
and Proposition 3 implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose p i p j as depicted on Figure 4 . (The case where p i < p j is handled in a similar manner.) Let h j (v j ) denote the marginal density forv j .
From the …gure we see that
From assumption (20) we obtain
Similarly,
and Proposition 3 implies the result. Figure 3 we see that q b = (1 F 1 (p 1 ))(1 F 2 (p 2 )) ;
Proof of Claim 4: From
The demand for product 1 on its own comes from two sources: the unconstrained and the constrained consumers. Write q 1 = x + (1 )X where x and X are respectively product 1 demand from the unconstrained and constrained consumers. From Figure 3 we see that
We need to show that (18) = f 1 (p 1 )F 2 (p 2 ) + f 2 (p 2 )(1 F 1 (p 1 ))
The …rst inequality follows from the assumption that f 1 =(1 F 1 ) is an increasing function, while the second inequality can be veri…ed directly. This completes the proof.
